Many validator nodes have the names of their team members presented on their web site. While it gives stakers a sense of trustworthiness, it also leaks details on the individual persons who are in effective control of the keys of a node. If we assume that validator nodes get attacked out of motivation for monetary benefit, then any such act would come along with a scheme of ransom as there is no other way to financially exploit a hack of a validator node. Such crimes could even be committed by extortionists with no hacking skills, they could simply target node operators for being known as persons who are administrating large amounts of assets, or for being the probable owner of assets in those cases where there is verifiable self-stake on a validator node. We do not feel comfortable having certain information on public web sites that everyone who knows our names could associate us with through simple searches on Google. Many from the validator community know our names from various KYC and personal contacts. However, we do not intend to make that easily accessible for everyone, and our opinion is that it would not necessarily be a recommendable practice. This also reflects our view on fundamental rights on financial privacy, making use of it, and proactively respecting those same rights of our stakers.